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Influenza Virus  
Subtypes H7N9  
and H5N1 in  
Humans, China
To the Editor: Human infection 
with a novel low pathogenicity influ-
enza A(H7N9) virus in eastern China 
has recently raised global public 
health concerns (1). The geographic 
sources of infection have yet to be 
fully clarified, and confirmed human 
cases from 1 province have not been 
linked to those from other provinc-
es. While some studies have identi-
fied epidemiologic characteristics 
of subtype H7N9 cases and clinical 
differences between these cases and 
cases of highly pathogenic influenza 
A(H5N1), another avian influenza af-
fecting parts of China (2–4), the spa-
tial epidemiology of human infection 
with influenza subtypes H7N9 and 
H5N1 in China has yet to be elucidat-
ed. To test the hypothesis of co-dis-
tribution of high-risk clusters of both 
types of infection, we used all avail-
able data on human cases in mainland 
China and investigated the geospatial 
epidemiologic features.
Data on individual confirmed hu-
man cases of influenza (H7N9) from 
February 19, 2013, through May 17, 
2013, and of influenza (H5N1) from 
October 14, 2005, through May 17, 
2013, were collected from the Chi-
nese Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention. The definitions of these 
cases have been described (3,5). A to-
tal of 129 confirmed cases of influen-
za (H7N9) (male:female ratio 2.39:1) 
and 40 confirmed cases of influenza 
(H5N1) (male:female ratio 0.90:1) 
were included in the analysis. The 
median age of persons with influenza 
(H7N9) was higher than for persons 
with influenza (H5N1) (58 years vs. 
27 years; z = −7.73; p<0.01). Most 
(75.0%) persons with influenza 
(H5N1) had direct contact (e.g., oc-
cupational contact) with poultry 
(including dead and live birds) or 
their excrement and urine, whereas 
most (64.3%) persons with influenza 
(H7N9) had only indirect exposure to 
live poultry, mainly during visits to 
live poultry markets.
Reported cases of influenza 
(H5N1) were distributed over 40 
townships in 16 provinces, where-
as cases of influenza (H7N9) were 
relatively more concentrated, in 108 
townships but only 10 provinces (Fig-
ure). To identify a spatial overlap be-
tween the primary cluster of influenza 
(H7N9) cases, detected in April 2013 
(relative risk [RR] 78.40; p<0.01), 
and the earliest space-time cluster of 
influenza (H5N1) cases, detected dur-
ing November 2005–February 2006 
(RR 65.27; p<0.01), we used spatio-
temporal scan statistics with a maxi-
mum spatial cluster size of 5% of the 
population at risk in the spatial win-
dow and a maximum temporal cluster 
size of 25% of the study period in the 
temporal window (6) (Figure). The 
results suggest that the overlap is not 
perfect and is concentrated around an 
area southeast of Taihu Lake (south of 
Jiangsu Province), bordering the prov-
inces of Anhui and Zhejiang. Smaller 
clusters of influenza (H7N9) cases 
were identified in the boundary of Ji-
angsu and Anhui Province (8 cases; 
RR 64.86; p<0.01) and Jiangxi Prov-
ince (Nanchang County and Qing-
shanhu District) (4 cases; RR 105.67; 
p<0.01). A small cluster of influenza 
(H5N1) cases was detected during 
2012–2013 along the boundaries of 
Guanshanhu, Yunyan, and Nanming 
Counties in Guizhou Province (3 cas-
es; RR 496.60; p<0.01). 
In addition, family clustering, 
defined as >2 family members with 
laboratory-confirmed cases, was 
found for influenza (H7N9) cases 
during March–April 2013 in Shang-
hai and Jiangsu Provinces and for 
influenza (H5N1) cases during De-
cember 2007 in Jiangsu Province. 
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Family clustering may indicate per-
son-to-person viral transmission or 
may reflect common exposure to in-
fected poultry or their excrement in 
the household or in a contaminated 
environment (7). No evidence sup-
ports person-to-person viral trans-
mission as the means of transmis-
sion in family clusters.
In conclusion, we found compel-
ling evidence that the high-risk areas 
for human infection with subtype 
H7N9 and H5N1 viruses are co-dis-
tributed in an area bordering the prov-
inces of Anhui and Zhejiang, which 
suggests that this area might be a 
common ground for the transmission 
of emerging avian influenza viruses 
in China. We also found that visits 
to live poultry markets or exposure 
to contaminated environments are a 
pathway to infection with influenza 
(H7N9) virus, whereas infection 
with influenza (H5N1) is more tied 
to occupational hazards. These dif-
ferences may reflect the differences 
in the pathogenicity of the viruses in 
poultry, which influences disease pro-
gression and identification of clinical 
signs further down the poultry market 
chain. Further empirical investiga-
tion into our findings could identify 
risk factors that might be involved 
in disease transmission to humans in 
high-risk areas and could help public 
health authorities develop targeted 
control and surveillance strategies to 
prevent disease transmission.
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Figure. Geographic and temporal distribution of human cases of infection with avian influenza subtypes H7N9 (circles) and H5N1 (triangles), 
China. A) Distribution and space-time clusters of human influenza (H7N9) and influenza (H5N1) cases, calculated by using Kulldorff’s 
scan statistics in SaTScan version 9.1.1 (6). B) Spatial overlap between influenza (H7N9) and influenza (H5N1) case clusters in an area 
bordering the provinces of Anhui and Zhejiang. C) Primary cluster of influenza (H5N1) cases in Guizhou Province (relative risk [RR] 496.60). 
D) Secondary cluster of influenza (H5N1) cases in Anhui and Zhejiang Provinces (RR 65.27). E) Primary (RR 78.40) and secondary clusters 
of influenza (H7N9) cases on the boundary of Jiangsu and Anhui Provinces (RR 64.86) and in Jiangxi Province (RR 105.67).
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New Variant of 
Rabbit Hemorrhagic 
Disease Virus,  
Portugal, 2012–2013
To the Editor: During November 
2012–February 2013, rabbit hemor-
rhagic disease virus (RHDV) strains 
belonging to the new variant RHDV 
were isolated in Portugal from wild 
European rabbits (Oryctolagus cu-
niculus subsp. algirus). The major 
capsid protein, VP60, of these strains 
was partially characterized. RHDV 
had been previously detected in Por-
tugal in 1989 (1). Before 2011, RHDV 
outbreaks in wild European rabbit (O. 
cuniculus) populations in the Iberian 
Peninsula were exclusively caused by 
strains belonging to genogroup 1 (2,3). 
In the Iberian Peninsula, 2 subspe-
cies of European rabbit are found, O. 
cuniculus subsp. algirus and O. cunic-
ulus subsp. cuniculus. These subspe-
cies are equally susceptible to RHDV 
(3). In 2011, a new variant was iso-
lated in young rabbits belonging to O. 
cuniculus subsp. cuniculus from a rab-
bitry in the province of Navarra, Spain 
(4). The topology of the phylogenetic 
tree that included this variant and the 
susceptibility of kits <2 months old 
suggest that this strain is similar to that 
described in France in 2010 (5).
Before the new variant of RHDV 
emerged and, on the basis of phyloge-
netic relationships, RHDV strains had 
been divided into 6 genogroups (G1–
G6) (1), with strains of G6, or RHD-
Va, having a distinct antigenic profile 
(6). All of these strains replicate in 
the liver and are responsible for caus-
ing death in rabbits >2 months of age. 
Nonpathogenic and weakly patho-
genic RHDV-related strains have also 
been described. The nonpathogenic 
and weakly pathogenic strains are phy-
logenetically distinct from the G1–G6 
strains with ≈20% of nucleotide di-
vergence (7); they typically replicate 
in the intestines (8,9). New variant 
RHDV causes death in kits as young 
as 30 days old and affects vaccinated 
and unvaccinated animals (4). Phylo-
genetically, this new variant falls be-
tween the nonpathogenic groups (4,5).
During November 2012–Feb-
ruary 2013, our laboratory, CIBIO, 
Universidade do Porto, Portugal, re-
ceived liver samples from wild adult 
rabbits and kits, belonging to O. cu-
niculus subsp. algirus, from 3 areas 
of Portugal, Valpaços, Barrancos, and 
Algarve. The rabbits had appeared 
dead and had clinical signs suggesting 
rabbit hemorrhagic disease (RHD). 
We analyzed the samples for RHDV 
by reverse transcription PCR. For this 
process, total RNA was extracted by 
using the RNeasy Mini Kit (QIAGEN, 
Hilden, Germany), according to the 
manufacturer’s instructions. Reverse 
transcription was performed by us-
ing oligo(dT) as primer (Invitrogen, 
Carlsbad, CA, USA) and SuperScript 
III reverse transcription (Invitrogen) 
as recommended by the manufac-
turer. Screening of the samples con-
sisted of PCR with a pair of primers 
as described by Dalton et al. (4). This 
pair amplifies a 738-bp fragment of 
the gene encoding the capsid protein, 
VP60 (PCR conditions are available 
on request). After purification, PCR 
products were sequenced on an au-
tomatic sequencer ABI PRISM 310 
Genetic Analyzer (PE Applied Bio-
systems, Foster City, CA, USA) with 
the same pair of primers.
The virus was detected in 15 sam-
ples, 5 from each locality. The obtained 
sequences were aligned with those 
available from public databases. Re-
trieved sequences represent the RHDV 
groups G1–G6, the nonpathogenic 
groups, and the new variant (GenBank 
accession nos. KF442960–KF442964). 
A phylogenetic tree was inferred in 
MEGA5 (10) by using a maximum-
likelihood (ML) approach. Reliability 
of the nodes was assessed with a boot-
strap resampling procedure consisting 
of 500 replicates of the ML trees. The 
best-fit nucleotide substitution model 
was determined by using MEGA5.
